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This paper examines the conditions under which exploration of a new, incompatible tech-nology is conducive to ﬁrm growth in the presence of network externalities. In particular,
this study is motivated by the divergent evolutions of the PC and the workstation markets in
response to a new technology: reduced instruction set computing (RISC). In the PC market,
Intel has developed new microprocessors by maintaining compatibility with the established
architecture, whereas it was radically replaced by RISC in the workstation market. History
indicates that unlike the PC market, the workstation market consisted of a large number
of power users, who are less sensitive to compatibility than ordinary users. Our numerical
analysis indicates that the exploration of a new, incompatible technology is more likely to
increase the chance of ﬁrm growth when there are a substantial number of power users or
when a new technology is introduced before an established technology takes off.
(Network Externalities; Exploration and Exploitation; Innovation; Technology )
1. Introduction
Strategic choice at the time of technological change
has been a focus of interest at the intersections of
diverse ﬁelds such as technology management, orga-
nizational learning, and industrial organization eco-
nomics. When a new technology offers uncertain
opportunities, a ﬁrm can choose to exploit an existing
technology to ensure its immediate survival. Alter-
natively, it can opt to explore the new technology,
which may provide better opportunities in the long
run (Levinthal and March 1981, Nelson and Winter
1982). Exploration of this sort, however, requires scare
resources that could be better used for enhancing
the ﬁrm’s market position through the reﬁnement of
the existing technology. Thus, a strategic dilemma
arises from the tension between the exploration of
new opportunities and the exploitation of old oppor-
tunities, which has been considered as a fundamen-
tal problem for adaptive systems (Holland 1975, 1992,
March 1991).
This study addresses such a dilemma in the pres-
ence of network externalities. The emergence of a
superior but incompatible technology often exacer-
bates the dilemma for incumbents, because the adop-
tion of it can increase the chance of enhancing the
performance of their products, but the incompati-
bility sharply reduces customer beneﬁts due to net-
work effects (Shapiro and Varian 1999). Intel faced
this sort of dilemma in the early 1990s, when the
reduced instruction set computing (RISC) architec-
ture challenged the complex instruction set comput-
ing (CISC) technology, which was the architecture for
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Intel’s prior microprocessors such as the 286 and 386.
If Intel had adopted RISC, the ﬁrm might have dra-
matically improved performance of its next genera-
tion microprocessors. But they would not have offered
a great deal of beneﬁts to customers who had many
kinds of software applications or ﬁles compatible with
the prior microprocessors. Grove (1996, p. 105) artic-
ulated Intel’s dilemma at the time:
The issue concerned the heart of our company, the
microprocessor business    [The issue] demanded a
decision immediately, and the decision was crucial.
On the one hand, if the RISC trend represented a
strategic inﬂection point and we didn’t take appro-
priate action, our life as a microprocessor leader
would be short. On the other hand, the 386’s fantastic
momentum seemed sure to extend into the 486 and
perhaps even to future generations of microprocessors
[based on the CISC architecture]. Should we abandon
a good thing, which for now at least was a sure thing,
and lower ourselves back down into a competitive
battle with the other RISC architectures, a battle in
which we had no particular advantage?
The theoretical literature presents two contrasting
managerial prescriptions to cope with this dilemma.
Studies of technology management and organiza-
tional learning have emphasized the exploration of
new technological possibilities by pointing out the
potential downfall of ﬁrms in the absence of explo-
ration. The exploitation of an existing technology is
often portrayed as a myopic choice, which may even-
tually cause ﬁrms to suffer from technological exhaus-
tion. On the other hand, research on network exter-
nalities has stressed the difﬁculty of gaining a foot-
ing by a new technology under network effects. The
commonly accepted view has been that each customer
receives greater beneﬁts—the larger is the installed
base of the selected technology. Thus, when an exist-
ing technology has built up a large installed base,
customers tend to turn away from a new, incompat-
ible technology. Apparently, this suggests that ﬁrms
are more likely to prosper by exploiting the existing
technology.
In the eyes of laymen, the above two streams
of research offer seemingly inconsistent managerial
prescriptions. Indeed, the history of the computer
industry illustrates the complexity of prescriptions.
Throughout the 1990s, the workstation market and
the PC market followed divergent evolutionary paths
in response to the new RISC technology. In the work-
station market, RISC replaced CISC (Khazam and
Mowery 1996). Sun prospered by effectively shifting
its technology base from CISC to RISC, while Digital
Equipment quickly lost its market share by delaying
the adoption of RISC (Utterback 1994). In contrast,
Intel, in the PC market, has continued to prosper by
making its new products compatible with the CISC
architecture (Botticelli et al. 1998). Apparently, ensur-
ing network beneﬁts turned out to be more impor-
tant than enhancing performance in the PC market. A
question is: Under what circumstances should incum-
bents explore a new, incompatible technology?
We address this question by modeling the situation
of two competing technologies in the presence of net-
work externalities. Although the differences between
our model and prior work on this issue will be fully
discussed in the next section, the main distinctions
arise in two primary aspects. First, we evaluate the
viability of exploring alternative possibilities by mod-
eling the evolution of the whole system. The method-
ological stance here is close in spirit to Nelson and
Winter (1977, 1982), Lant and Mezias (1990, 1992),
Mezias and Glynn (1993), and Mezias and Eisner
(1997). A beneﬁt of this approach is that one need
not assume that buyers and sellers know the future
consequences of their choices. Thus far, standard eco-
nomic analysis with this assumption has not been
able to address how new, incompatible technologies
are successfully introduced under uncertainty (Katz
and Shapiro 1994). We believe our approach can ﬁll
this gap. Second, we classify two types of customers:
power users and light users. Power users are deﬁned
to be much less sensitive to compatibility than light
users. Prior work on network externalities assumed
that all the users are equally sensitive to compatibil-
ity, ignoring the role of power users in the market’s
transition to a new technology.
The incorporation of the two factors permits us to
resolve the seeming inconsistency described above.
We ﬁnd that the exploitation strategy is more likely to
increase the chance of ﬁrm growth when a majority of
customers are not power users, or when demand for
an old technology has been escalated. But when there
are a substantial number of power users or when a
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new technology emerges before such an escalation of
demand, the exploration strategy is more likely to
be effective. We believe that sorting out conditions
in this way can give new insights to managers who
face a strategic dilemma between exploration and
exploitation.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The
second section reviews the literature germane to the
central issue. The third section introduces a formal
model. The fourth section shows the results of com-
puter simulations. Then, we discuss the main ﬁndings
and their implications.
2. Literature Review
This section reviews the relevant literature by focus-
ing on exploration and exploitation.
2.1. Learning Myopia Argument vs.
Lock-in Argument
As previously mentioned, the literature consists of
two seemingly contrasting views concerning our
central question: the learning myopia and lock-in
arguments.
First, we turn to the learning myopia argument. In
the face of radical technological change, the poten-
tial downfall of established companies has attracted
a great deal of attention in research on technol-
ogy management (Anderson and Tushman 1990,
Henderson and Clark 1990, Christensen 1993, Tripsas
1997) and organizational learning (e.g., Levinthal
and March 1981, Levitt and March 1988, Lant and
Mezias 1990, 1992, Cohen and Levinthal 1989, Mezias
and Glynn 1993, Mezias and Eisner 1997). These
streams of research acknowledge that there are gains
with respect to experience in a technology. Once
a ﬁrm accumulates sufﬁcient experience with one
technology, it is natural for the ﬁrm to be trapped
in this technology or to be blinded to alternative
opportunities—this phenomenon is labeled “compe-
tency trap” by Levitt and March (1988) or “learning
myopia” by Levinthal and March (1993).
The literature, however, warns that too much
exploitation of the existing technology may lead
the ﬁrm to be locked out of opportunities in the
long run. For example, March (1991, p. 73) noted:
“Since long-run intelligence depends on sustaining
a reasonable level of exploration, these tendencies
to increase exploitation and reduce exploration make
adaptive processes potentially self-destructive.” This
is particularly true when an incremental gain in per-
formance declines with the use of the existing technol-
ogy. Indeed, research on learning curve (e.g., Argote
et al. 1990, Argote and Epple 1990, Epple et al. 1991)
has established that such diminishing performance
gain over time is prevalent. With this assumption,
Lee and Ryu (2002) numerically demonstrated that
an undue focus on exploitation eventually leads to
technological exhaustion in the market where ﬁrms
compete for developing new products. The upshot is
that ﬁrms exploiting the established technology to the
exclusion of exploring a new technology are expected
to underperform in the long run.
On the other hand, the lock-in argument has
focused on the difﬁculty of gaining a footing by a
new, incompatible technology. When a given product
is subject to network externalities, its value increases
with the number of customers using similar ones
or products compatible with it (Shapiro and Varian
1999). Studies have indicated that the presence of a
dominant installed base can inhibit innovation due
to excess inertia in the buyers’ adoption behavior
(e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1986, Arthur 1989, 1994).
Because there are customers who appreciate compati-
bility, ﬁrms that achieve backward compatibility with
existing products can ensure their immediate survival
at least. Furthermore, when these ﬁrms grow faster
and dominate the market, there may be little room for
their rivals exploring a new, incompatible technology.
This suggests that exploitation could yield a better
outcome than exploration.
The seeming inconsistency between the two argu-
ments above can be cast in light of the trade-off
between exploration and exploitation. In the pres-
ence of network externalities, a choice between explo-
ration and exploitation reﬂects an underlying tension
between performance and compatibility (Shapiro and
Varian 1999). Consider a ﬁrm contemplating whether
to introduce a new, incompatible architecture (e.g.,
RISC) for future generations of microprocessors. If
the ﬁrm chooses to explore this architecture, it may
greatly improve the performance of its products in the
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long run. However, many customers may not switch
to them, because the new architecture is incompati-
ble with existing software products or ﬁles these cus-
tomers have created. Then, the ﬁrm would be exposed
to a great risk in the short run.
The ﬁrm can reduce this imminent risk by exploit-
ing the existing architecture and by ensuring back-
ward compatibility or network beneﬁts. For example,
when Intel introduced the 486, a CISC-based micro-
processor, the company was able to attract previous
adopters of PCs, who might have shown inertia to
switch to an incompatible RISC processor. By intro-
ducing the 486, however, Intel had to forego potential
stand-alone beneﬁts (e.g., superior price-performance
ratio, faster time to market, and scalability) from
RISC. What made Intel’s strategic choice difﬁcult in
the early 1990s was the uncertainty of how the mar-
ket would respond to the products of its rivals if
they were able to widen the performance gap between
RISC and CISC microprocessors in the long run. Had
there been a road map regarding when network ben-
eﬁts outweigh stand-alone beneﬁts, Intel’s decision
would have been much easier.
2.2. Network Externalities and
Technological Change
Our study also addresses a controversy in the litera-
ture on network effects. Despite the popularity of the
lock-in argument, critics have argued that many new,
incompatible technologies have been somehow suc-
cessfully introduced (Katz and Shapiro 1994). In par-
ticular, Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 1995) argued
that cases of lock-in to inferior technologies are rare in
the long history of technological change. These obser-
vations raise a question of how the market makes
transition between incompatible technology regimes.
In limited situations, the customer lock-in can be
mitigated when “converters” are available (David
and Bunn 1988). For example, Microsoft Word was
introduced after WordPerfect dominated the market.
But Microsoft Word was able to attract WordPerfect
users because Microsoft Word was supplied with a
converter that can translate a WordPerfect ﬁle into
a Microsoft Word ﬁle. An economy could beneﬁt
from converters when they are costless and they
can perfectly wipe out incompatibilities. Farrell and
Saloner (1992), however, argued that in many cases,
the tasks to achieve compatibility through convert-
ers become more complex and remain costly. Further-
more, conversion often degrades performance. Farrell
and Saloner’s (1992) analysis showed that the avail-
ability of converters could make matters worse if
converters are costly and imperfect. Near-perfect con-
verters with small costs can make the aforementioned
dilemma disappear. In this paper, we focus on many
instances where such converters are infeasible.
Garud and Karnøe (2001) noted that the under-
standing of Schumpeterian dynamics could throw
light on how the market system escapes from lock-
in. In particular, they argued that entrepreneurial
ﬁrms often ﬁnd ways to develop better technologies
and leapfrog dominant ﬁrms. Indeed, Becker (1998)
observed that monopoly positions due to lock-in
tend to be frequently punctuated in high-tech indus-
tries where ﬁrms race to develop better technolo-
gies. Among the few studies that addressed this issue
are Farrell and Saloner (1986) and Katz and Shapiro
(1992). They found that whether the market is biased
for or against new incompatible technologies depends
on such variables as the date of new technology intro-
duction, costs of the two technologies, size of the
installed base of the incumbent technology, strategic
pricing, and so on.
Although the impressive contribution of these stud-
ies is evident, they did not take the uncertain aspect
of Schumpeterian competition into account. Instead,
they resort to economic analysis based on the rational-
ity assumption that buyers and sellers know ex ante
what would happen in equilibrium. Had such a com-
plex consequence been known in advance, Intel must
not have struggled with the strategic dilemma to
begin with. This assumption is rather heroic when
there is fundamental uncertainty about technologi-
cal change and when it is difﬁcult to foresee how
adoption patterns emerge over time. Furthermore, the
perfect rationality deﬁes the existence of the tension
between exploration and exploitation. As a conse-
quence, little is still known about how new, incompat-
ible technologies are successfully introduced in reality
(Katz and Shapiro 1994). The computational approach
pioneered by Nelson and Winter (1978, 1982) and
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Cyert and March (1963) permits us to ﬁll this gap by
relaxing the rationality constraint.
In addition, we construct two types of customers:
power users and light users. Power users are deﬁned
to be less sensitive to compatibility than light users.
Power users are also assumed to be keener on new
technologies than light users. Thus, power users
could be categorized as “technology enthusiasts” or
“visionaries” who wish to be ﬁrst to adopt a new
technology (Moore 1991). In the computer indus-
try, power users are sophisticated enough to write
code and modify software on their own. Thus, they
can easily switch to incompatible hardware platforms
by recompiling their own source code (Khazam and
Mowery 1996). On the other hand, light users could
be categorized as “pragmatists” or “conservatives”
who adopt innovations only after seeing the proven
track records of their usefulness (Moore 1991). In the
computer industry, light users usually do not write
their own code and heavily rely on off-the-shelf soft-
ware applications.1 Thus, the higher performance of
an incompatible computer alone adds little value for
them. Much of prior work on network externalities
has included the latter in the model but has excluded
the former (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985, Farrell and
Saloner 1986, Arthur 1989). We will show that there is
a substantial gain by adding the new concept, power
users.
3. Model
We model the dynamics of industry evolution where
there are two competing technologies subject to
network externalities. Initially, ﬁrms develop prod-
ucts based on one technology, and customers begin
to adopt these products. Then, a new, competing
technology emerges and offers higher potential for
improving the performance of new products. How-
ever, this technology is incompatible with the existing
installed base. In this situation, incumbent ﬁrms face
1 A referee suggested that the recompiling possibility could be con-
sidered as the presence of a converter. Then, it should be classiﬁed
as an imperfect converter because its functionality is user speciﬁc.
That is, the converter is not available to light users who cannot
write and compile their own code, while it is available to power
users due to their programming capability.
the trade-off between compatibility and performance.
Firms may choose to exploit the technology in use
to ensure backward compatibility with existing prod-
ucts. Alternatively, ﬁrms may choose to explore the
new technology to sharply increase technological per-
formance at the cost of compatibility. Therefore, ﬁrms’
strategic choices basically fall into two divergent cat-
egories: the exploration strategy vs. the exploitation
strategy. Mixed strategies are possible,2 but the key
to our analysis at this point is to sort out conditions
under which each ideal strategy is more conducive to
the long-term survival of ﬁrms.
Figure 1 presents a blueprint about how our model
works. It mainly consists of two parts: customer activ-
ities in the demand-side dynamics and ﬁrm activ-
ities in the supply-side dynamics. In the demand side,
purchase and repurchase subroutines constitute cus-
tomer activities. In the supply side, each ﬁrm’s choice
of exploration or exploitation, new product devel-
opment, and ﬁrm growth and exit are three main
subroutines of our simulation model. The technical
details of these ﬁve subroutines will be discussed
below.
3.1. Demand-Side Dynamics: Product Adoption
First, we turn to customer activities in the demand
side. Consider a product characterized by net-
work externalities and incessant improvement of
product performance over time. In the computer
industry, for example, a microprocessor is subject
to network externalities because customer beneﬁts
come primarily from its compatibility with software
applications. Furthermore, its performance has been
improved through technological changes. Thus, adop-
tion dynamics are inﬂuenced by network beneﬁts and
changes in product performance.
2 Lee and Ryu (2002) examined the mixed strategies by assuming
that their implementations are not too costly. In some cases, how-
ever, mixing exploration with exploitation would be prohibitively
expensive. Indeed, Grove (1996, p. 104) noted: “Supporting a
microprocessor architecture with all the necessary computer-related
products—software, sales and technical supports—takes enormous
resources. Even a company like Intel had to strain to do an ade-
quate job with just one architecture.”
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Figure 1 Simulation Routines for the Model
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Purchase and Repurchase Decision. The key to
adoption dynamics in our model is the customer’s
product choice. Each customer buys either one or no
unit of a product in each period. Product adoption
consists of new purchases and repurchases. New pur-
chases are generated by neophytes who have not yet
adopted any product, whereas repurchases are gener-
ated by experienced customers.
First, consider a process for new purchases. Let Sit
denote customer i’s surplus. She buys one unit of a
product if Sit > 0. When there are more than one prod-
uct that satisfy this condition, customer i chooses a
product to maximize Sit . It is determined by the fol-
lowing four components:
Sit = qkjt+ainkt−1+di−p (1)
Here, the ﬁrst component qkjt represents the perfor-
mance of the product that ﬁrm j produces at time
t with technology k (k ∈ OLD NEW). The second
component ainkt−1 represents network beneﬁts. Like
Arthur (1989) and Farrell and Saloner (1992), we
assume that the network beneﬁts grow linearly with
the number of adopters.3 In particular, the term ai
measures customer i’s importance to network effects,
and nkt−1 is network size for technology k at time t−1.
The third component di represents customer dispo-
sition toward new technology adoption. Like much
of prior work (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985, Farrell
and Saloner 1992), we assume di to be heterogeneous
3 We also experiment with a nonlinear function (e.g., a logistic func-
tion), and show that dynamic behaviors of our model are not too
sensitive to the linearity assumption (see Appendix B).
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Figure 2 Consumer Heterogeneity and Product Adoption
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Product Performance + Network Effects - Product Price
among customers. In particular, customer i’s timing of
adoption depends on the magnitude of di as shown in
Figure 2. If a customer is an early adopter, the value
for di will be close to zero, whereas its value for a
laggard will be low. This customer heterogeneity is
assumed to follow a bell-shaped distribution in Fig-
ure 2, which is represented by a beta distribution with
shape parameters 12, where 1 = 2 and scope
parameters −v0.4 This distributional assumption
is widely accepted in the diffusion literature (e.g.,
Rogers 1995) and the marketing literature (e.g., Moore
1991, 1995). The last component p represents the price
of a product. Like Winter (1971) and Arthur (1989),
we assume that the price is ﬁxed over time.5
Now, let us turn to a process for repurchases. An
experienced customer i’s surplus is
Sit = qkjt+ainkt−1+di− q∗ +ain∗ +di−p
= qkjt− q∗+ainkt−1−n∗−p (2)
where q∗ and n∗ are the performance and the net-
work beneﬁts of the adopted product at time t∗ < t,
4 By changing shape parameters 1 and 2 of a beta distribution,
one can ﬂexibly generate uniform, normal, and skewed distribu-
tions (Johnson and Kotz 1970). Our sensitivity analyses indicate
that the key results of our model do not depend too much on dis-
tributional assumptions.
5 Although prices for many products, in reality, vary over time, this
feature is ignored for simplicity. Thus, our model is more relevant
to markets where ﬁrms compete on the basis of R&D rather than
price.
respectively.6 The customer chooses one unit of prod-
uct j for which (2) is largest. If (2) is not positive for
all j , she buys none of the products. Unlike much of
prior work (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985, Arthur 1989,
Farrell and Saloner 1992), this repurchase process in
our model allows customers to switch to an incom-
patible technology.
Note that the high level of network beneﬁts can
offset low product performance or vice versa. Thus,
an inferior technology may be adopted when net-
work beneﬁts are large. Alternatively, customers may
switch to a new technology when stand-alone beneﬁts
from qNEW are substantially large. Unlike other mod-
els, the stand-alone beneﬁts in our model change over
time because product performance qkjt is the dynamic
outcome of ﬁrm j’s R&D, which will be discussed in
the supply-side dynamics.
Another important distinction is that we do not
assume that potential adopters know the size of an
equilibrium network in advance, whereas this strong
assumption is typical in other standard economic
models (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1992). Along the
line of Arthur (1987, 1989), we instead assume that
each customer makes a purchase (or repurchase) deci-
sion every period by looking at the number of previ-
ous adopters.7
Demand-Side Inertia. The demand-side inertia
previously described is a force that blocks the mar-
ket’s transition to a new, incompatible technology.
Due to the presence of this force, some ﬁrms choose
not to explore a new technology. The source of such
inertia in our model is customer beneﬁts arising from
the installed base for technology k. So, in the market
with M customers, a measure for the demand-side
inertia for technology k at time t, kt , is
kt =
∑
i ain
k
t−1
M
 (3)
Power Users vs. Light Users. The customer pop-
ulation consists of two types: power users and light
users. As deﬁned in the previous section, power users
6 Note that the second term ainkt−1 −n∗ is zero if the alternative
product is compatible with the product in use.
7 This is the main distinction between a dynamic model and a static
model. See Arthur (1987, 1999) for the detailed technical discussion.
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are less sensitive to network beneﬁts than light users.
That is, ap < al, where ap and al denote power users’
and light users’ network sensitivities. As discussed
in the previous section, power users are also early
adopters in the diffusion of a new technology, while
light users represent a majority of late adopters. This
requires that power users’ disposition values dp be
represented by values in the upper tail of the beta
distribution, while the remainder in the distribution
should represent light users.
3.2. Supply-Side Dynamics
We turn now to ﬁrm activities in the supply side.
Central to our model is how ﬁrm j at time t gener-
ates a new product associated with qkjt , which, in turn,
shapes ﬁrm j’s growth. Two generic features of the
model are R&D investment, and ﬁrm growth and exit,
which are adopted from Nelson, and Winter’s (1978,
1982) Schumpeterian models. Given these features
and the demand-side dynamics, we are concerned
with how a ﬁrm’s choice of technology k affects ﬁrm
growth and exit processes.
New Product Development. There are two types
of costs: (1) R&D cost, and (2) cost for production
capacity expansion. We assume that ﬁrm j invests
R&D cost CRjt to improve its technological capabil-
ity in each period t. The decision for allocating R&D
cost CRjt is determined by the previous period capi-
tal, Kjt−1 such that
CRjt =maxrKjt−1  (4)
where r is the percent of R&D cost on the previous
capital and  is a minimum R&D cost for staying in
the industry. The larger the ﬁrm is, the more it can
invest in improving its technological capability.
The term “technological capability” is used to refer
to the ability to develop better performing products.
Speciﬁcally, let kjt denote ﬁrm j
′s technological capa-
bility at time t. We assume that ﬁrm j’s product
performance qkjt is a random variable, which follows
a beta distribution with shape parameters (kjt , !
k)
and scale parameters [0, w]. kjt is determined by its
cumulative learning in technology in use k, which
is assumed to be a function of its cumulative R&D
investments (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Then, it fol-
lows that ﬁrm j’s cumulative investments for technol-
ogy k increase shape parameter kjt at the following
rate:
kjt = kj0+
∑t
u=0CRju
$k
 (5)
where $k speciﬁes the difﬁculty of assimilation of
technology k.
We further assume that qkjt is monotonically increas-
ing in time as far as the ﬁrm stays with technology k.
That is,
qkjt =maxqkjt qkjt−1 (6)
The above dynamic equation simply says that ﬁrm
j sells an improved product at time t only if R&D
improves its product performance. Otherwise, the
ﬁrm will sell the previous product. As ﬁrm j invests
more in technology k, it becomes better able to uti-
lize its technological potential up to the upper bound
u. Firm heterogeneity in product performance results
from various degrees of learning with respect to tech-
nology k.
There is another type of cost for capacity expansion.
Let CP denote the cost of increasing one unit of pro-
duction capacity. We assume that ﬁrm j increases one
more unit of its production capacity at period t only
if it sold all of its products at period t− 1. In reality,
ﬁrms may increase more than one unit of production
capacity per period. However, relaxing this assump-
tion would complicate the model without yielding
substantially new insights. This simplifying assump-
tion is also adopted in Winter’s (1971) evolutionary
model. Let PCjt denote ﬁrm j ′s production capacity at
period t. Then,
PCjt = PCj0+
∑t
u=0CPju
CP
 (7)
As typical in other models of network externalities,
variable costs in our model are ignored for simplicity
(e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985, Kristiansen 1998).
Firm Growth and Exit. The process of ﬁrm growth
and exit is summarized by the time path of ﬁrm capi-
tal. The state of ﬁrm capital reﬂects the historical accu-
mulation of revenue less costs over time. Thus, ﬁrm
j’s capital at time t+1 is
Kjt+1 = Kjt−CRjt−CPjt+Rjt (8)
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where Rjt represents ﬁrm j’s revenue at time t. Firm
growth, or capital accumulation, results from positive
net incomes from sales of products. Firm j will have
positive sales at time t only if the performance of its
products satisﬁes a customer’s need, which was pre-
viously described by customer i’s surplus Sit . Here,
revenue can increase in two ways. First, the ﬁrm
can improve the performance of its products through
R&D. Second, an increase in network size for the
ﬁrm’s technology further boosts its sales. If a ﬁrm
constantly fails to satisfy customers’ needs and thus
has no sales of its products, its capital declines and
reaches an absorbing state of insolvency. This happens
when its capital is below the minimum R&D cost  .
Thus, we deﬁne the condition for exit as Kkt <  .
Exploration vs. Exploitation. The central issue
in this paper is a tension between exploration
and exploitation, which caused a strategic dilemma
for Intel as previously described. Firms with the
exploration strategy may beneﬁt from superior perfor-
mance over time at the cost of backward compatibil-
ity, whereas ﬁrms with the exploitation strategy may
beneﬁt from network externalities at the cost of com-
pelling performance. In our model, the performance
improvement of technology k is controlled by a tun-
able parameter !k. The smaller the value of !, the
higher the rate of improvement, as shown in Figure 3.
We assume that the new technology improves at a
faster rate than the old technology. That is, !NEW <
!OLD. However, when a ﬁrm ﬁrst adopts a new tech-
nology, it starts from a low level of performance. As
Figure 3 Organizational Learning and Performance Improvement
far as the ﬁrm continues to reﬁne the new technology
for a sufﬁciently long time, it will eventually outper-
form the old technology. But before it happens, the
ﬁrm adopting the new technology can be driven out.
The simulation results in the next section show when
adopting the new technology is advantageous.
4. Results
The simulation results here numerically illustrate
Schumpeterian competition in the presence of net-
work externalities. We ﬁrst show the key features of
the basic model. Then, we address the central research
question by experimenting with selected parameters
of the basic model.
4.1. Simulation of the Basic Model
As a starting point, we numerically demonstrate the
behavior of the basic model, which favors exploitation
over exploration. The basic model is restrictive in the
sense that the two key parameters, the proportion of
power users in the customer population and the tim-
ing of new technology introduction, are ﬁxed. In the
next subsection, we experiment with these parame-
ters to show under what conditions ﬁrms with explo-
ration outperform the others. The two key parameters
in the basic model are set as follows: a new technol-
ogy emerges at period 30, and there are no power
users. The other details of parameter values are in
Appendix A.
According to strategic responses to the new tech-
nological opportunities at period 30, we classify ﬁrms
into two groups: (1) the exploration group, and (2) the
exploitation group. The two groups pursue an iden-
tical strategy based on one technology at the early
stage. When a new, incompatible technology emerges
at period 30, 500 ﬁrms in the exploration group adopt
a strategy that switches to the new technology. On
the other hand, the other 500 ﬁrms in the exploita-
tion group continue to exploit the established tech-
nology. The simulation here is to illustrate the under-
lying dynamics that lead to the performance gap
between these two groups. To evaluate the differ-
ence in the long-run performance between the two
groups, we look for three measures for each group
at the end of a simulation run. Two measures are
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Figure 4 Number of Units Sold Over Time: A Typical Simulation Run
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the number of survivors and the average amount of
capital. Also, by multiplying the two values together,
we develop another performance measure: aggregate
capital.
Let us turn to the simulation results of the basic
model. Figure 4 shows the number of units sold over
time in a typical simulation of the basic model. All
new purchases are completed before period 40, and
repurchases bolster demand at the later stage of evo-
lution. Figure 4 suggests that demand begins to accel-
erate before period 20. Figure 5 shows the cumula-
tive number of units sold over time. The dynamics
are characterized by a well-known S-shaped curve
with roughly three phases: (1) introduction (before
period 20: a phase of slow sales growth); (2) takeoff
(period 20 to 80: a phase of explosive sales growth);
and (3) saturation (after period 80: a phase of a slow-
down in sales growth).
Figure 5 Adoption Dynamics: A Typical Simulation Run
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In the basic model, the new technology fails to gain
a footing as shown in Figure 6. This is closely asso-
ciated with the installed base of the old technology,
which increases along with the number of its adopters
as shown in Figure 6. The new technology barely
builds up its installed base. The bias toward the exist-
ing technology, in turn, affects the performances of
the exploration and the exploration strategies. Table 1
shows that the group of ﬁrms exploiting the old tech-
nology outperform the group of ﬁrms exploring the
new technology. The two groups have the same num-
bers of survivors (42 ﬁrms) in simulation period 29
just before the exploration group switches to the new
technology. It is because there is no difference in
strategy between the two groups before period 30.
However, at period 100, there are 42 survivors in the
exploitation group, whereas there are 23 survivors in
the exploration group. Also, there is a substantial dif-
ference in the average amount of capital between the
two groups after period 40. The average amount of
capital for survivors with the exploitation strategy is
larger than that for survivors with the exploration
strategy.
As shown in the last row of Table 1, product per-
formance is enhanced with a faster rate by the new
technology than the old technology until period 50.
Yet, since the network beneﬁts far outweigh the bene-
ﬁts associated with technological superiority, the new
technology fails to build up its installed base. This is
reminiscent of Arthur’s (1994, p. 24) informal argu-
ment: “[A]n early-start technology may already be
locked in, so that a new arrival, although potentially
Figure 6 Dynamics of the Installed Base: A Typical Simulation Run
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Table 1 Exploitation vs. Exploration: Results of 100 Simulation Runs of the Basic Model
Period of time 1 10 20 29 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Total sales
Exploitation 8 459 2,788 8,615 9,485 20,537 35,857 55,447 79,305 106,952 125,804 135,076
Exploration 8 477 2,908 8,834 8,834 9,897 10,837 11,357 11,824 12,105 12,195 12,245
Number of survivors
Exploitation 500 500 45 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Exploration 500 500 45 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 32 23
Average capital
Exploitation 1,000 366 4,182 13,128 14,364 28,538 45,050 62,962 81,711 100,065 97,749 76,873
(0) (323) (3,931) (6,444) (6,632) (8,061) (8,920) (9,435) (9,743) (10,089) (24,759) (38,315)
Exploration 1,000 367 4,686 13,378 14,620 10,812 8,556 6,258 4,744 3,439 2,507 1,692
(0) (330) (4,033) (6,572) (6,762) (6,303) (6,128) (4,980) (3,713) (2,929) (2,264) (1,651)
Installed base
Exploitation 16 522 4,072 15,815 16,681 19,375 19,696 19,619 19,475 19,423 19,600 19,600
Exploration 16 522 4,072 15,815 0 264 304 381 524 576 400 400
Average performance
Exploitation 99 810 2,277 4,552 4,844 7,359 8,643 9,222 9,512 9,669 9,759 9,805
(97) (198) (1,003) (1,686) (1,665) (954) (427) (206) (110) (63) (43) (39)
Exploration 99 812 2,325 4,609 3,119 8,063 8,742 8,990 9,115 9,187 9,439 9,568
(97) (201) (1,030) (1,705) (1,223) (871) (639) (533) (476) (440) (219) (120)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
superior, cannot gain a footing.” After period 50, the
new technology does not progress as fast as the old
technology because the exploration group could not
invest in R&D as much as the exploitation group.
Note that many ﬁrms leave the market before simula-
tion period 20. This happens because many ﬁrms run
out of their initially endowed capital as they consis-
tently fail to generate positive sales.
4.2. Simulation Experiments
The simulation results of the basic model reassure the
popular proposition that exploration of a new tech-
nology is not a good idea when the market builds
up excess inertia for an old technology. Now, we turn
to the central questions: Under what circumstances
would the exploration group better perform than the
exploitation group? What are the mechanisms that
allow the market to overturn such inertia? To answer
these questions, we experiment with the two key
parameters of the basic model while holding other
parameters constant: (1) the timing of the new tech-
nology introduction, and (2) the proportion of power
users to light users in the customer population. A
characteristic feature in the adoption dynamics is the
demand-side inertia, which is measured by customer
beneﬁts due to network effects. We show that the two
parameters affect dynamics of the demand-side iner-
tia. All of the results here were obtained by running
the simulation models 100 times.
Timing of New Technology Introduction. First,
we report the result of a simulation experiment, which
varies the timing of a new technology introduction,
given that there are no power users in the market.
The result in Figure 7 shows that the timing inﬂuences
the demand-side inertia. Not surprisingly, the later
the new technology emerges, the larger the demand-
side inertia gets. In particular, the demand-side iner-
tia seems to dramatically increase after demand for
the old technology takes off. Note that demand starts
to take off roughly around period 20 (again, see Fig-
ures 4 and 5).
Intuitively, the above result seems to be related to
the performance of the exploration group and the
exploitation group. Table 2 shows that the exploration
group clearly beats the exploitation group in terms
of survival rate and average capital when the new
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Figure 7 Effect of the Timing of New Technology Introduction on
Demand-Side Inertia
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technology is introduced before demand for the estab-
lished technology takes off (or before period 20). Fig-
ure 8 also shows that as long as the new technology
emerges before period 20, the aggregate amount of
capital of the exploration group is larger than that
of the exploitation group. However, the exploitation
strategy is more effective when the new technology
is introduced after period 20. The exploitation group
clearly beats the exploration group in the average
amount of capital and the aggregate amount of capi-
tal after period 20. As shown in Table 2, the amount
of average capital of the exploration group is smaller
than that of the exploitation group after period 20.
The upshot is that timing of new technology introduc-
tion inﬂuences the effectiveness of exploration and
exploitation.
Proportion of Power Users. We now report the
results of a simulation experiment when power users
Table 2 Effect of the Timing of New Technology Introduction: Results of 100 Simulation Runs
Period of time 0 10 20 30 40 50
Total sales
Exploitation 0 44690 88948 135076 134365 135418
Exploration 36016 92920 65756 12245 19359 34056
Number of survivors
Exploitation 0 31 38 42 42 42
Exploration 500 47 30 23 42 42
Average capital
Exploitation 0 9890 35941 76873 79915 78395
Exploration 3091 26178 32451 1692 1324 3491
Figure 8 Effect of the Timing of New Technology Introduction on
Aggregate Capital
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are present in the market. Figure 9 shows that when
there are no power users (i.e., when all customers
are light users), the demand-side inertia monotoni-
cally increases in time until it reaches a plateau and
stabilizes around it. On the other hand, when the
proportion of power users are above 10%, the iner-
tia systematically decays over time after it reaches a
peak. Intuitively, this is possible when the exploration
group with compelling performance can take away
customers from the exploitation group that uses the
old technology. Indeed, the erosion of the old tech-
nology’s market share is clearly shown in Figure 10.
When 10% of the customers are power users, the new
technology takes away the market shares from the
old technology, eventually cornering the market. The
nonmonotonic decay of the inertia in Figure 9, thus
is explained by the declining market share of the old
technology.
Table 3 and Figure 11 show the proportion of power
users against the performance of each group. When
564 Management Science/Vol. 49, No. 4, April 2003
LEE, LEE, AND LEE
Exploration and Exploitation
Figure 9 Effect of the Proportion of Power Users on Demand-Side
Inertia
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the proportion of power users is less than 10%, the
exploitation group has a greater amount of average
capital than does the exploration group. When the
proportion is greater than 10%, the exploration group
always outperforms the exploitation group. These
results indicate that the exploitation strategy is more
effective when light users dominate the market. On
the other hand, when power users represent a sub-
stantial proportion of the customer population, the
exploration strategy is more effective. These results
suggest that the power users play a critical role in
sustaining new incompatible technologies.
Sensitivity Analysis. We conducted additional
analyses to assess how sensitive our results are to
the assumption of linear network effects. In particu-
lar, we adopted a nonlinear effects function as shown
Table 3 Effect of the Proportion of Power Users: Result of 100 Simulation Runs
Percent of power users 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Total sales
Exploitation 135076 59237 58959 57388 56366 54545 56779 57771 57918 59330 58557
Exploration 12245 73573 71108 69266 69742 69625 67590 66890 68351 68125 68147
Number of survivors
Exploitation 42 29 28 28 28 27 28 27 27 27 27
Exploration 23 30 29 27 28 28 26 26 27 27 27
Average capital
Exploitation 76873 22289 23739 21894 21844 21548 22681 24065 24134 25648 25416
Exploration 1692 40640 41018 43201 42820 42859 43756 45389 43762 44173 43524
Figure 10 Dynamics of the Installed Base in the Presence of 10% of
Power Users
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in Figure B.1. The results of this analysis are shown in
Appendix B. The main ﬁndings do not change much.
The only notable result is that the exploration group
cannot outperform the exploitation group unless the
proportion of power users is greater than 30%. In the
case of linear effects, the exploration group did bet-
ter when this proportion was greater than 10%. The
effectiveness of the exploration strategy requires addi-
tional power users in the nonlinear case because a
new technology builds up network effects slowly at
the beginning as shown in Figure B.1.
In addition, we ran a number of variations on
key parameters such as technological opportunity
for a new technology, customer disposition distribu-
tion, price, and network sensitivity (see Appendix B).
Although the details of the results are not reported
here, we found that our main ﬁndings are rather
robust with respect to moderate changes in these
parameter values.
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Figure 11 Effect of Proportion of Power Users on Aggregate Capital
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent of Power Users
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
 C
a
p
it
a
l 
in
 P
er
io
d
 1
0
0
Exploration Group
Exploitation Group
5. Discussions and Conclusion
This study sorted out conditions under which explo-
ration of a new, incompatible technology is con-
ducive to ﬁrm growth in the presence of network
externalities. Our ﬁndings resolve the seeming incon-
sistency between the learning myopia argument and
the lock-in argument in the literature. The learn-
ing myopia argument emphasizes the importance of
exploration for the long-term growth of the ﬁrm. Our
ﬁndings support this argument when power users
represent a substantial portion of the customer pop-
ulation or when a new technology emerges before
demand for an established technology has been esca-
lated. In these cases, the exploitation of the estab-
lished technology to the exclusion of exploring a new
technology is more likely to result in underperfor-
mance as expected in the literature (Levitt and March
1988, March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993, Lee and
Ryu 2002). The results are consistent with the histor-
ical context of the workstation market when RISC, a
new incompatible technology, challenged incumbents.
Digital Equipment Corporation delayed the adoption
of RISC and quickly lost its market share, whereas
Sun beneﬁted from aggressively exploring RISC. In
this market, there are many power users who are able
to write code and modify software on their own. The
incompatibility of hardware platforms causes a small
problem for them because they can easily recompile
their source code. Thus, the market’s migration to the
new technology appeared to be smooth.
On the other hand, the lock-in argument empha-
sized the difﬁculty of establishing a market posi-
tion with a new incompatible technology. Our ﬁnd-
ings support this argument when a new technology
emerges after demand for an old technology has been
escalated or when there are few or no power users in
the customer population. In these cases, the demand
evolution will show excess inertia with respect to an
existing technology, because customer beneﬁts due
to network effects signiﬁcantly outweigh stand-alone
beneﬁts from performance. Therefore, there is little
room for the growth of ﬁrms that explore a new,
incompatible technology. It turned out that Intel’s
strategic choice to maintain compatibility in the PC
industry was sensible. Indeed, PC Week’s 1988 survey
indicated that compatibility in the PC industry was
the most important criterion for buying a PC (Yofﬁe
1994). In general, this market has been dominated by
light users who are not sophisticated enough to write
code or to modify software to run on RISC platforms.
Thus, the higher performance of incompatible, RISC
machines adds little value for them.
Our ﬁndings also speak to the puzzling debate
regarding the lock-in argument. Despite the argu-
ment’s popularity, Liebowitz and Margolis (1990,
1995) and Katz and Shapiro (1994) pointed out
that historically, many new, incompatible technolo-
gies have been successfully introduced. For exam-
ple, in the PC market, MS-DOS was introduced after
CP/M-80 became established as the industry standard
566 Management Science/Vol. 49, No. 4, April 2003
LEE, LEE, AND LEE
Exploration and Exploitation
operating system (Steffens 1994). But MS-DOS was
somehow able to subsequently corner the market.
Our model provides potential explanations for this
puzzle when converters cannot be available. Appar-
ently, MS-DOS was able to beat CP/M-80 in the 1980s,
partly because it was the early market where technol-
ogy enthusiasts or power users were more likely to
enter and where the demand-side inertia should have
been low. Steffens’ (1994, p. 375) historical analysis
is suggestive of this point: “Initially, under CP/M-80,
applications software had been fairly restricted in its
scope.” Usually, light users, who are pragmatists or
conservatives, do not enter such an immature market
with limited applications available (Moore 1991).
In addition, there is a more general issue that has
applicability beyond the computer industry. When a
product has lock-in properties, heterogeneity among
users in the extent to which they value those prop-
Figure 12 Decision Tree for Technological Choice
QUESTION
 Should a firm explore a superior but
incompatible technology?
Is developing converters
COMPLEX  and COSTLY?
Has demand for
an established technology
been ESCALATED?
Are there enough
POWER USERS?
TARGET POWER USERS
until the new technology
builds up its installed base.
It is WORTHWHILE
to try the new technology.
Chance for winning
is SMALL
with the new technology.
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
?
erties will tend to make exploration more feasible.
The essence of this argument does not depend too
much on the speciﬁc industry context we considered.
To assess the relationship between consumer hetero-
geneity and efﬁcacy of exploration, we manipulated
a fraction of power users in the customer popula-
tion. As previously discussed, one can consider power
users as “early adopters” in Rogers’ (1995) term or
“technology enthusiasts” in Moore’s (1991) term. In
the marketing literature, these are fairly generic terms
that have wide applicability.
Now, let us turn to managerial implications of our
ﬁndings. Exploration vs. exploitation causes a seri-
ous strategic dilemma as illustrated in the Intel case
(Grove 1996). This study provides such a ﬁrm with a
strategic guideline, which is summarized in the deci-
sion tree in Figure 12. First, the ﬁrm should con-
sider whether it could develop a converter that is not
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complex and costly. If this is possible, it is a good idea
for the ﬁrm to explore the new technology, because
the converter will mitigate problems associated with
incompatibility. If developing it is too complex or
costly, the ﬁrm should consider the next question: Has
the adoption of an old technology been escalated? If
the answer is no, the demand-side inertia should be
low and it is worthwhile to explore a new technology.
If the answer is yes, the ﬁrm should next consider
whether there are enough power users. Because they
are individuals with low reservation prices by deﬁni-
tion (i.e., they are willing to pay a substantial price for
a new technology), the size of this group determines
staying power of ﬁrms exploring the new technol-
ogy. If the company can ﬁnd only a few or no power
users, it is not advisable to explore the new technol-
ogy. If there are a reasonably sufﬁcient number of
them, they will sponsor the ﬁrm’s R&D investments
as well as other operating costs for the ﬁrm to stay
in business. At this stage, it may be a good idea for
the ﬁrm to stay focused on the power user niche. As
the ﬁrm builds up a substantial installed base over
time, it may leverage this base more aggressively to
penetrate into a light user segment, or often the mass
market. Our suggestion here is similar to what Moore
(1995, p. 27) called “bowling alley marketing” anal-
ogy: “Each niche is like a bowling pin, something that
can be knocked over in itself but can also help knock
over one or more additional pins.”
However, the advice at this point is crude at best
and needs to be further examined. Our ﬁndings are
simply the logical consequences of the assumptions
that we made. Although many of our assumptions are
consistent with the historical contexts of the computer
industry, our ﬁndings are drawn from the analysis
under the restricted parameters. When some of our
assumptions are violated, or when one tries to apply
our ﬁndings beyond the contexts we considered, the
validity of our ﬁndings is uncertain. Also, there could
be other unknown mechanisms (e.g., different topolo-
gies of customer connectivity) that affect dynamics of
the demand-side inertia. This possibility points to the
opportunities for future studies.
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Appendix A: Parameters for the Basic
Simulation Model
Our central assumption is that there exists a tension between explo-
ration and exploitation, which can lead to a strategic dilemma for
managers. To construct such a situation in a computational model,
we need to ﬁne tune three main parameters, qNewjt , q
Old
jt , and ain
k
t−1.
Because network beneﬁts and performance effects jointly create this
tension in our model, neither of them alone should always dom-
inate when a customer chooses a product. If performance effects
dominate, i.e., the new technology is far superior to the old tech-
nology (or qNEWjt  qOLDjt , almost all customers will choose the new
technology. On the other hand, if the new technology is not supe-
rior to the old technology (i.e., qNEWjt ≤ qOLDjt , there is no need for
ﬁrms to worry about the new technology. Our basic strategy for
choosing the ranges for the related parameters is to exclude these
two extreme cases, where the tension between exploration and
exploitation should be minimal. In our model, qNEWjt and q
OLD
jt are
stochastic outcomes from ﬁrm j’s R&D, which are controlled by
!NEW and !OLD. Thus, given ainkt−1, tuning the relative magnitudes
of the latter two parameters can construct the situation we wish to
consider. The values of all the parameters for our basic simulation
model are shown below.
Demand-Side Parameters
Size of customer population: M = 20000.
Shape parameters for the distribution of customer disposition
di& 12= 33.
Scope parameters for the distribution of customer disposition
di& −v0= −100000.
Power users’ sensitivity to compatibility: ap = 00.
Light users’ sensitivity to compatibility: al = 05.
Product price: p = 100.
Supply-Side Parameters
Initial number of ﬁrms: N = 1000.
Initial capital: K0 = 1000.
Percent of R&D cost on the previous capital: r = 005.
Minimum R&D cost for staying in the industry:  = 50.
Initial production capacity: PC0 = 5.
Cost of increasing one unit of production capacity: CP = 50.
Technology scope: 0w= 010000.
Initial shape of old technology: OLD0 !
OLD= 0100.
Initial shape of new technology: NEW0 !
NEW= 030.
Difﬁculty of assimilation of technology k& $k = 50.
Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis
Nonlinear Network Effects. We assessed the sensitivity of our
results to the choice of a network effects function. As illustrated in
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Figure B.1 Nonlinear Network Effects Function
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Figure B.1, we used a nonlinear effects function, aif nkt−1, where
f nkt−1=
1
k+abnkt−1

In particular, we tuned the values of the function’s parameters with
k = 000005, a = 05, and b = 0999. Note that the dynamics of the
system are nonlinear regardless of whether we use the linear or the
nonlinear effect functions. That is, dynamics of either case show
that network effects for the old technology are initially somewhat
limited until a critical mass is reached. After this point, the effects
become more pronounced until they approach some asymptote.
The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Figures B.2 and
B.3. Our main ﬁndings do not substantially change with the non-
linear network effects variation.
Variation in Technological Opportunity for a New Technol-
ogy. We ran a variation in technological opportunity for a new
technology !NEW. Given !OLD = 100, we experimented with !NEW =
10203040, and 50. Sensitivity analysis shows that little substan-
tive change was detected. Our ﬁndings are rather robust with this
variation.
Figure B.2 Effect of the Timing of New Technology Introduction on
Aggregate Capital: Average over 100 Trials with the Non-
linear Network Effects
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Figure B.3 Effect of the Proportion of Power Users on Aggregate Cap-
ital: Average over 100 Trails with the Nonlinear Network
Effects
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Customer Disposition Distribution Variation. We tested the
sensitivity of our results to the distributional assumption on cus-
tomer disposition di by varying shape parameters (1, 2= 11,
(32), and (23). We found that our main ﬁndings were not sensi-
tive to this variation.
Variation in Price. We tested the sensitivity of our results to the
price variation with p = 80, 120, and 150. We found that there was
no qualitative change that affects our main conclusions.
Network Sensitivity Variation. We ran a variation in light users’
sensitivity to compatibility with al = 01, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8,
0.9, and 1.0. We found that when al is smaller than or equal to
0.4, network effects do not seem to play a substantial role for the
given time scale. The new technology always dominates, and ﬁrms
exploring it will always do better than ﬁrms staying with the old
technology. Because we are interested in a situation where a tension
between exploration and exploitation is pronounced, we should
assume away this extreme case. To construct a situation where man-
agers like Grove (1996) face a strategic dilemma, the value of ai
appears to be at least 0.5. When it is above 0.5, the exploitation
group outperforms the exploration group as was the case in the
basic model.
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